The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NOPR”) on December 20 proposing changes to its regulations regarding the horizontal market power analysis required for market-based rate (“MBR”) sellers.  The proposed rulemaking picks up on an earlier effort in Order No. 816 to ease the regulatory burden on MBR sellers in RTO/ISO markets.  The current proposal would eliminate the need for certain MBR sellers to submit indicative screens with their initial MBR application, triennial updates, and change in status notices.  The exemption would apply to all MBR sellers in RTO/ISO markets with RTO/ISO-administered energy, ancillary service, and capacity markets subject to FERC-approved RTO/ISO market monitoring and mitigation.  For RTO/ISO markets that lack an RTO/ISO-administered capacity market (that would be CAISO and SPP), MBR sellers would be exempt from the requirement to submit indicative screens if their MBR authority is limited to sales of energy and/or ancillary services.  FERC also proposed eliminating the rebuttable presumption that FERC-approved RTO/ISO market monitoring and mitigation is sufficient to address horizontal market power concerns for capacity sales in CAISO and SPP.

Background

MBR sellers are currently required to submit two indicative screens, a pivotal supplier screen and a wholesale market share screen, in their initial MBR applications, change in status notices, and any updated market power analyses. Passage of both screens creates a rebuttable presumption that the seller does not have horizontal market power.  If a seller fails either screen, it is presumed to have horizontal market power.  To rebut the presumption of market power, the seller must present evidence through a delivered price test or other means to show that it does not possess market power.  However, sellers in an RTO/ISO market who fail the screens have an alternative.  They may instead rely on FERC-approved RTO/ISO market monitoring and mitigation to address market power concerns.  In 2014, FERC issued a NOPR proposing to eliminate the indicative screen requirement for those RTO/ISO sellers because it yielded little practical benefit due to their ability to rely on RTO/ISO market monitoring and mitigation.  FERC decided not to act on that proposal in Order No. 816 but stated that it may consider the issue in the future.

The Current NOPR

In the current NOPR, FERC states that the indicative screens provide marginal additional market power protections given that FERC has found that RTO/ISO market monitoring and mitigation adequately mitigate a seller’s market power and FERC has access to other data regarding horizontal market power. FERC notes that all RTOs/ISOs have mitigation provisions for energy offers.  While not all RTOs/ISOs have market power mitigation provisions for ancillary services, concerns about market power in ancillary service offers are mitigated through the mitigation of energy offers, since ancillary service prices are based on the opportunity cost of not generating energy.  Finally, ISO-NE, NYISO, PJM, and MISO all have capacity markets with FERC-approved market power mitigation.
Continue Reading FERC Issues NOPR to Eliminate Horizontal Market Screens for Certain MBR Sellers

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) long-awaited Order 845 (Reform of Generator Interconnection Procedures and Agreements) was issued on April 19 after over two years of consideration of the issues. Order 845 is the first grid-wide major reform of FERC’s Generator Interconnection Procedures and Agreements since Order 2003 was issued 15 years ago.  Order 845 adopts reforms that are designed to address three goals: (1) improving certainty for interconnection customers, (2) promoting more informed interconnection decisions, and (3) enhancing the interconnection process.

Order 845 revises FERC’s pro forma Large Generator Interconnection Procedures (“LGIP”) and Large Generator Interconnection Agreement (“LGIA”) to recognize the changing landscape of technology and is intended to provide interconnection customers with new opportunities to interconnect their projects faster and more cost-effectively.  For example, transmission providers must now allow interconnection customers (at the interconnection customer’s option) to build the needed transmission owner interconnection facilities and stand-alone network upgrades in all cases. Previously, interconnection customers only had this option if the transmission owner could not meet the dates proposed by the interconnection customer.  Thus, an interconnection customer has newly granted flexibility in the construction of the transmission owner interconnection facilities and stand-alone network upgrades. If the transmission owner returns a high cost estimate, then the interconnection customer can manage the construction of the transmission owner interconnection facilities. On the other hand, if the transmission owner cost estimate is reasonable, the interconnection customer can choose to leave the construction responsibilities for the transmission owner interconnection facilities and stand-alone network upgrade with the transmission owner. Interconnection customers can now make these decisions based on both timing and cost considerations.Continue Reading Helping the Hook-Up: FERC’s Generator Interconnection Procedures Reform Seeks to Improve Information Flow, Recognizes Changing Technology and Opens Further Opportunities for Storage

In February, FERC issued Order 841, Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators (the “Order”), requiring RTOs and ISOs to establish new market participation rules for energy storage that recognize the physical and operational characteristics of these resources. While the Order set forth some minimal requirements that

In a move that was widely anticipated across the energy industry, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) today issued an order that terminated a notice of proposed rulemaking that had been initiated in October 2017 in response to a demand by Energy Secretary Rick Perry that FERC enact rules to compensate certain resources for what

Or so Secretary Rick Perry and the DOE would have us believe.  Approximately three weeks ago, the DOE made its pitch to FERC and the energy industry that a lack of “resiliency” threatens the U.S. power grid.  The responses are in.  And the shock and bewilderment that immediately followed the release of the Secretary’s surprising

Tax equity investments, and potentially other passive investments, in renewable energy just became that much easier to make.  Today, in response to a petition for declaratory order filed in January 2017 by a coalition of investors and project sponsors, FERC ruled that tax equity investments in public utilities does not trigger section 203 of the

By a notice issued yesterday, September 28, Rick Perry, the Secretary of Energy, utilized section 403 of the DOE Act to require FERC to cause organized energy market operators (ISOs/RTOs) to compensate “fuel secure generation”, i.e., coal power, for grid “resiliency”–something that apparently puts Americans at risk despite statements by NERC to the contrary or

On April 4, 2017 (NextEra Desert Center Blythe, LLC v. FERC, Case No. 16-1003 (“NextEra”)), the DC Circuit issued a decision remanding back to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) orders denying NextEra Desert Center Blythe, LLC’s (“NextEra”) complaint against the California Independent System Operator Corporation (“CAISO”) regarding the allocation of congestion revenue rights (“CRRs”) under the CAISO tariff. The DC Circuit’s ruling was narrow, based on finding ambiguity in the relevant contract and tariff provisions where FERC determined there was none. The court’s decision highlights the importance of addressing potential regulatory cost recovery options in a FERC-jurisdictional contract.
Continue Reading Generator Receives Another Shot at Obtaining CAISO Congestion Revenue Rights

As a follow up to yesterday’s post, President Trump’s Energy Independence Executive Order (the “Order”) has now been posted on the White House website, a summary of which can be found here.  Over the last week, many pundits and industry insiders have speculated on its contents, with many having a fairly clear crystal