On July 27, 2010, the Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas, issued its decision in TXU Portfolio Management Company, L.P., v. FPL Energy, LLC, et al., 2010 Tex. App. Lexis 5905 (2010). The case arose when three FPL wind farms (the "Wind Farms") located in the McCamey area of West Texas experienced ERCOT-imposed generation curtailments imposed by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas ("ERCOT") during 2002-2005. The Wind Farms had each entered into a power purchase agreement (“PPA”) with TXUPM under which they agreed to deliver a minimum quantity of energy and renewable energy credits (RECs) each year. Because of the deficiencies caused by the ERCOT generation curtailments, TXUPM sued the Wind Farms for deficiency damages under the PPAs. The Wind Farms counterclaimed, asserting that TXUPM materially breached each of the PPAs by failing to insure enough "transmission capacity" to allow the three wind farms to generate and deliver all of the electricity they were theoretically able to generate given wind conditions.
Section 2.03 of the PPAs required TXUPM to arrange for "all services, including without limitation Transmission Services . . . necessary to deliver Net Energy." The Texas Court of Appeals concluded that this provision required TXUPM to supply transmission service sufficient to accept delivery of energy actually generated by the project and delivered to the interconnection point. Contrary to the Wind Farms’ argument, however, Section 2.03 did not require TXUPM to make sure there was enough transmission capacity in the McCamey area to make sure that the three wind plants could in fact generate every MWh they were theoretically capable of generating given wind conditions.
This outcome is not too surprising–it would have been very unusual had the Court of Appeals concluded that an offtaker’s duty to supply transmission services at the delivery point amounted to an implied duty to arrange for the construction of (very expensive) transmission infrastructure sufficient to avoid generation curtailments. Utilities everywhere can breathe a sigh of relief that the Court of Appeals did not read this duty into the PPAs.
The fact that the Wind Farms had failed to deliver enough output to meet the annual minimum quantities specified in the three PPAs was not in dispute. Since the court concluded that TXUPM had not breached the PPAs by failing to supply transmission capacity, the only remaining question was the calculation of damages.
Stepping away from the court’s decision for a moment, though, it’s worth noting that there’s a separate provision that is typically included in PPAs for intermittent renewable energy, and it apparently was not included in the three PPAs in dispute here, perhaps because of their 2000-2001 vintage. An annual minimum output guarantee requires a wind developer to take both mechanical availability risk and wind risk–the plant’s output can be reduced below the minimum level if the wind doesn’t blow as hard or as often as expected, or if the wind turbines and other equipment are not available as often as they should be. However, these risks are to some extent within the developer’s control–wind risk can be addressed by thorough wind studies, and mechanical availability can be managed using the developer’s O&M program. Generation and transmission curtailment, on the other hand, are typically outside the developer’s control and can be affected by delays in completing transmission infrastructure, additions of other intermittent resources to the grid, routine maintenance of the transmission system, emergencies and other factors.
Recognizing this, renewable energy PPAs usually provide that curtailed energy is counted as if it were generated for purposes of determining whether a plant has achieved its output guarantees. Although the requisite language is often omitted from utility pro forma renewable PPAs, most utilities are willing to agree if pressed that energy that could have been generated but for curtailment(s) should be counted as if it were generated for purposes of testing the project’s output guarantee. There may be a little scuffling over the proper method for calculating the quantity of energy and RECs that would have been generated “but for” the curtailment, but the real fight is usually over whether the PPA is in whole or in part a "take or pay" contract in which the utility is required to pay for some or all of the output that is actually curtailed. Cf. FPL Energy Upton Wind I, L.P., v. City of Austin, 240 SW3d 456 (2007), reh’g denied 2007 Tex App LEXIS 9306 (Tex App Amarillo 2007) (the Texas Court of Appeals ruled that ERCOT-imposed curtailments are not the same as voluntary economic curtailments by the power purchaser under a PPA and thus are not curtailments that the purchaser must pay for).
In any case, the Wind Plants in this case did not receive credit for curtailed energy under the three PPAs, so the court considered the deficiency as a given and turned to calculating the amount of damages. The three PPAs had hard-wired $50/MWh as the liquidated damage payment due for each MWh of deficiency below the annual output guarantee. This number was based on the per MWh penalty the Texas PUC was expected to impose, as of the time the PPA was entered into, on utilities that failed to secure enough renewable energy. The Wind Plants argued that this amount bore no resemblance to TXUPM’s cover damages at the time of the alleged breach and had persuaded the trial court to declare the liquidated damages clause to be unenforceable. The Texas Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the Wind Farms had failed to prove (1) that a measure of damages was ascertainable when the PPAs were entered into, or (2) that the $50/MWh rate was an unreasonable estimate of TXUPM’s actual damages.
Using the deficiency rate of $50/MWh and the Wind Farms’ total net deficiencies of 580,465 MWh for 2002 through 2005, TXUPM claimed $29,023,250 in deficiency damages. Bear in mind that these are just the deficiency damages, and thus only a part measure of the pain the plants suffered–they also had to forego a sale at the contract price and lost a Production Tax Credit (PTC) on each MWh curtailed. For utilities that are slow to acknowledge that curtailment risk is an important issue for the intermittent energy developer, this case offers a very succinct $29 million dollar explanation of why developers, lenders, and equity care so much about the topic.